DAY 197 | Air India 171: Another Germanwings?

The Official Preliminary Report is out, and confirms fuel cutoff to both engines shortly post-takeoff

Some aviation safety experts have suggested that the fatal crash of Air India Flight 171 may have been the result of deliberate human action, raising, for the first time, the possibility of a pilot-induced crash. The sequence of fuel cutoff switches and cockpit audio potentially suggest that the crash may have stemmed from deliberate actions taken in the cockpit, including murder-suicide.

Others believe that there is a risk that the event may be prematurely attributed to crew action or error, which would be both technically and ethically unjustified at this stage of the investigation.
 
➡️ Read and/or download the full Preliminary Report here (pdf)

Excerpts from the 15-page Preliminary Report

Re-examining the Accident: A Different Lens

According to the Preliminary Report the 787-8 experienced a catastrophic dual engine shutdown just seconds after take-off, resulting in loss of lift and the subsequent crash. The flight reached a recorded airspeed of 180 knots indicated at approximately 08:08:42 UTC, at which point Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cut-off switches moved from RUN to CUTOFF, one after another, with a 1-second gap. 

Engine N1 and N2 parameters began decreasing immediately as fuel supply ceased. The Ram Air Turbine (RAT) deployed and began supplying hydraulic power by 08:08:47 UTC.

The fuel cut-off switches were returned to RUN by the crew (Engine 1 at 08:08:52, Engine 2 at 08:08:56), prompting automatic FADEC-controlled relight logic.

Despite the precise logging of flight data and system states, the report fails to provide the timestamp when the flight crew became aware of the cut-off switch positions being in CUTOFF. This is crucial for determining crew situational awareness, duration of dual engine inactivity and validity of potential crew response time assessments.

The omission suggests either a lack of integrated CVR/FDR correlation or selective reporting of cockpit human factors. It has been disclosed that one pilot observed the unexpected switch movement and questioned the other with the remark, “Why did you cut-off?” The response was, “I did not.” The crew then immediately returned both switches to RUN. This exchange strongly indicates neither pilot initiated the switch movement.

The event occurred in a high-workload phase (shortly after V1), during which deliberate dual engine shutdown is both procedurally and physically improbable. The switch movement was un-commanded and unexpected by the operating crew. The near-simultaneous movement of both fuel cut-off switches from RUN to CUTOFF (1-second apart) is inconsistent with typical manual crew input. These switches are physically separated, requiring deliberate, coordinated, two-handed action or participation by both pilots. The observed 1-second interval suggests a systemic or logic-based command, not human action. Furthermore, the switch to RUN occurred within seconds, again suggesting reactionary crew correction rather than procedural engine shutdown.

There is a risk that the event may be prematurely attributed to crew action or error, which would be both technically and ethically unjustified at this stage. Historical precedent such as the initial responses to the 737 MAX accidents shows how pilot error narratives can be emphasized before full system-level analyses are complete.

In this case the crew explicitly denied moving the switches. Timing and switch behavior support an un-commanded system event. Early framing of the cause as human error without CVR time correlation risks misrepresenting root causes and delaying safety-critical design investigations.

The available data strongly indicates that the fuel cut-off switches transitioned to CUTOFF without crew intent, immediately leading to a dual engine shutdown during the most critical phase of flight. If this was caused by a systemic fault in control logic, electrical architecture, or design vulnerability, it must be transparently acknowledged and addressed by Boeing and relevant regulators.

The premature framing of this event as pilot error, absent corroborated timing data and system fault analysis, would not only be technically unsound but also a disservice to the victims, crew, and aviation safety worldwide. (Comment posted to “Aviation Expert Flags Pilot Suicide”, YouTube)

More comments from YouTube channels:

• I worked with switches like that for decades (Lockheed) and there is no way they are being accidentally moved. And personally I think that's a dumb place to put them, They should be in the forward part of the overhead all by their little lonely selves. Maybe even put a guard on them so you have to open the guard to shut off the engine.
  
  
• The 1 sec delay between the switches toggling off is clear indication of intentional operation with one hand.
  
  
• Engine switches aren't mechanically controlling the engines, electric cables and controller are in the middle. I think there's still a possibility that switch off signal was given out by cables shorting, not mechanical movement of the switches...
  
  
• I've accumulated over 5,000 hours in the  C-130 as an FE. It has dozens of those  spring-loaded switches. Never had one fail or accidentally move. They don't move with just a simple flick. In fact, they won't move at all when bumped. It takes a deliberate and specific action to move them. Two failing at the exact same time would be next to impossible.
  
  
• The fact that one pilot noticed so rapidly that the cut-off switches was the cause gives me the impression that this pilot really saw the other pilot do it. If the switches were simply not seating properly and accidentally moved back to off it would have been difficult to notice rapidly in this critical phase of flight focusing on other parameters related to initial climb out.
  
  
• The question was not just did you cut it, it was “why” did you cut it. Like if he saw the other pilot doing it. He is not trying to understand how it happened to be in the cut-off position. But why he did the action of cutting the engines.
  
  
• As a Quality Program Manager with decades of experience, I find it unlikely that BOTH switches mechanically failed at the same time even by bumping. One of the pilots intentionally moved both switches.
  
  
• The possibility of it being accidental is so remote but definitely worth mentioning. I have thousands of hours using that same design and have only seen one go bad and we were  on the ground during start and had the cut-off switch replaced.
  
  
• The only indication is that the fuel switches were moved to “cut-off”. It implies that it could be a human intervention. It's not going to happen automatically because of a software error. It's got to be deliberately done. We've all gone through several events involving human intervention. I only hope this is not another.

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